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Abstract
In today’s world of advanced computing power at the fingertips of any user,
computer security should be a primary concern. Information is power and this power
is within the computer system. If the information within computer systems cannot
be trusted then the power that comes from such information cannot be properly
used. Rootkits are software programs that are designed to establish and maintain
an environment in which malware may hide on a computer system after successful
compromise of that computer system. Rootkits cut at the very foundation of the trust
in information and subsequent power.
This thesis examines rootkit hiding techniques, rootkit finding techniques and
develops attack trees and defense trees to identify deficiencies in detection and further
increase the trust in information systems. The developed attack and defense trees
identified that enumeration is not sufficient to defend against rootkits. A developed
classification of rootkits helps fill the gaps in enumeration of rootkit techniques and
gives direction for further detection development. By fully understanding what areas
need to be addressed in detection, better and more complete tools will come to fruition.
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A Study of Rootkit Stealth Techniques
and Associated Detection Methods
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Computer networks and their associated devices have been under attack by
hackers for some time, and defenses have been developed to protect against a myriad
of attacks. However, in recent years a powerful new class of software called rootkits
and also known as stealth technology has been developed.
Rootkits are software programs that establish and maintain an environment
in which malware can hide on a computer system after successful compromise of
that computer system. Since the inception of rootkits in the 1980s [8], rootkits have
improved in both their techniques and ability to protect hackers and their tools from
being discovered. McAfee(R) Avert(R) Labs indicates that over the last three years
the “incident rate of stealth technology has increased by more than 600 percent [34,
35]”, and “The number of rootkits submitted ... in 2006 compared to the first quarter
of 2005 increased by nearly 700%. The number of Windows-based stealth components
dominate the landscape, with an increase of 2300% from 2001 to 2005 [34,35].”
There is often ample time between the discovery of vulnerabilities and patching
of that vulnerability to install a rootkit. Installation of a rootkit compounds the effects
of the original compromise because a rootkit creates and maintains an environment
in which a software entity may hide itself and its effects thus making the original
compromise much more difficult to detect and remove.
There are many ways to mitigate threats to a computer system such as fire-
walls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Instrusion Prevention Systems (IPS).
However, because of the time gap between vulnerabilities and patches, the increasing
capabilities of exploits, and the large increase in numbers of rootkits computers are
1
still very vulnerable. Thus, it is vital to understand how rootkits hide and how they
are found in order to build a rootkit attack tree that can identify holes in detection
techniques.
1.2 Overview
Rootkits create and maintain an environment for attack tools, such that a user
does not know of their presence on a compromised machine. However, the rootkit does
not gain access to the machine, rather, it maintains the access. In this research Rootkit
Hiding Techniques (RHTs)are explored as well as the Rootkit Detection Techniques
(RDTs) that are being used by some currently available tools. We analyze these
hiding and discovery techniques to identify deficiencies in detection.
Attack trees for rootkits are developed which give a high level overview of impor-
tant areas to defend in computer systems. An experiment in detection is conducted
using a rootkit to find rootkits. Although operating systems other than Windows(R)
are discussed, this research focuses on Windows(R) rootkits for two reasons: First,
operating systems differ in names for various tables, in functionality, and in stability
but the concepts are roughly the same (i.e., each has hardware interface(s), sched-
uler, kernel, libraries, system calls, and distinctions between user and kernel level
permissions) meaning the same general conclusions and attack trees can be shared
with minor modifications to suit each system (cf., Appendicies A and B.) Second, ac-
cording to McAffee(R) “The share of Linux-based techniques has gone from a high of
roughly 72 percent of all malware stealth components in 2001 to a negligible number
in 2005, while the number of Windows(R)-based stealth components has increased by
2,300 percent in the same time period [35].”
1.3 Research Statement
In this research we study the methods by which rootkits hide and also how they
can be detected. These hiding and finding techniques are used to create attack trees
from which deficiencies in current detection techniques can be identified, identified
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deficiencies can be used to increase the effectiveness of computer system defenses.
This effort includes examples of current rootkits and rootkit detectors.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This chapter gives motivation, an overview, and a research statement as well as
the organization of the thesis. Chapter Two contains a literature review that encom-
passes operating systems, classification systems, trusted computing, exploits versus
patches, and gives a general background on rootkits. Chapter Three describes vari-
ous hiding techniques as well as examples of these techniques. The hiding techniques
are followed by various finding techniques used by RDTs. Chapter Four explains the
research findings and describes the System Under Test (SUT) as well as experimental





Attacks against computer systems have a wide range of effects and purpose.
Some attacks are meant to be malicious in various degrees, while others are simply
for curiosity. Regardless of the intent of an attack, we require the ability to defend
our computer systems and allow/deny access to our computer systems as we see fit,
not as an intruder may see fit. In attempt to protect and study the defense of our
computer systems many classification systems or taxonomies have been developed
and are discussed in Section 2.3.
Computer attacks may have a long period of time in which to occur because of
the length of time between discovery of a vulnerability (a software flaw that allows
other than intended operations to occur) and the application of a patch (a piece of
code used to replace/fix software vulnerabilities), which is further explained in Sec-
tion 2.5 of this thesis. If vulnerabilities are left unchecked and a threat (something
willing to take advantage of the vulnerability) exists then our computer systems are
at risk. This risk ranges from exposure (the simple loss of data) to the complete
loss of control over a machine. The next step, once a successful computer attack has
occurred, is that of maintaining control; this control can be maintained by rootkit
software. Just as a country does not or should not fight a battle and ignore the
war, a computer attack is simply the beginning (a battle) to lay the ground work
for maintaining control over the computer asset (the war). As noted by Anton Chu-
vakin of iDEFENSE Labs, “Rootkits are automated software packages to setup and
maintain an environment on a compromised machine.” According to Chuvakin, the
first evidence in the public domain of Rootkits was discovered in the mid 1990s [15].
Rootkits are explained further in Section 2.6, of this thesis. This thesis will seek to
help identify rootkit stealth techniques and identify deficiencies in rootkit detection
techniques. By identifying deficiencies in detection we can learn to better detect and
subsequently remove rootkits. The subsequent sections of this chapter will give the
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reader a background in operating systems, classification systems, trusted computing,
exploits vs patches, and rootkits.
2.2 Operating Systems
In order to understand how a rootkit might install itself and hide in a computer
we must understand a computer from the architecture level. Silberschatz, Gagne, and
Galvin in their book Operating System Concepts, divide a computer system into four
main areas: hardware, the operating system, application software, and users using
Figure 2.1 to illustrate [59].
Figure 2.1: Abstract view of the components of a computer
system [59].
The user of a computer system uses hardware input/output devices such as the
keyboard and mouse in order to start desired tasks. Those hardware I/O devices
interact with application software in order to accomplish the desired tasks. The
operating system is the intermediary between the hardware, user, and application
software which acts as a manager between the user, the hardware, and the application
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software of a computer system [59, 65]. A good example used by Silberschatz et al,
is that the operating system is “Like a government, it performs no useful function by
itself. It simply provides an environment within which other programs can do useful
work” [59].
If we look at Figure 2.1, we notice that there are a few layers within the diagram
in which a rootkit could insert itself, namely: at the application level, the operating
system level, and at the hardware level. Although inserting rootkits at the hardware
level may be feasible, as documented by John Heasman in his paper Implementing and
Detecting a PCI Rootkit [28], for this thesis, we will focus on the first two levels, paying
special attention to the operating system level with its many sub-levels. Within each
operating system is a structure called a kernel which, according to McKusick and
Neville-Neil in their book The Design and Implementation of the FreeBSD Operating
System, “...is a small nucleus of software that provides only the minimal facilities
necessary for implementing additional operating-system services” [43]. The size and
functionality of kernels have increased over the years but the intent remains the same,
such that the kernel controls what and when each thread, process, or task is run and
for how long. The following subsections will give the background needed for the
Windows, Linux, and BSD OSs. Furthermore, these sections will show what each of
the main divisions are in each OS. However, as will be seen, the operating systems
are very similar at least from a high level component view and attack perspective.
Not all of the tables or important structures will be named equivalently be-
tween operating systems but the underlying architecture of how an operating system
behaves when an input/interrupt occurs is similar. Max Bruning states in his ar-
ticle A comparison of Solaris, Linux, and FreeBSD that, “Once you get past the
different naming conventions, each OS takes fairly similar paths toward implementing
the different concepts” [6]. For example, in Linux or Windows, when an interrupt
is triggered, the interrupt handler takes over. The interrupt handler will then check
an interrupt descriptor table (IDT) to know how to handle the particular kind of
interrupt/system call request, the system call table is checked and then control jumps
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to the address found. Control of this process can be usurped either by changing the
interrupt handler so that it uses a completely new IDT, or by changing addresses in
the IDT [64]. Execution of a system call in a UNIX-like operating systems (which
parallels that of a Windows OS) is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: UNIX-like OS: System call flow [7].
2.2.1 Windows OS. According to Silberschatz et al, Windows was designed
for “...security, reliability, Windows and POSIX application compatibility, high per-
formance, extensibility, portability, and international support” [60]. As can be seen in
Figure 2.3, the Windows OS was created in many modules. The main areas of which
to take note are the Hardware-Abstraction Layer, the Kernel, the executive, and the
usermode subsystems. The Kernel is the part of the operating system that decides
what, when, and for how long each thread is going to run based on parameters that
it receives as to priority [60].
In the Windows OS we find rootkits of three main types, namely patching
(replacement of code sections), hooking (altering execution paths), and data structure
manipulation (altering data structures). Windows much like any operating system is
subject to attacks via patching because of the need to allow programs to run with
varying permissions which can be granted by an unknowing user. However, steps have
been taken to deter this concept of patching by concepts such as digital signing which
can verify the integrity of applications.
7
Figure 2.3: Block Diagram of Windows XP OS [59].
Windows is also subject to hooking, in part because this functionality is allowed
(given the appropriate permissions) in order to monitor other processes. Finally, Win-
dows is also subject to data structure manipulation because, as with other operating
systems, there are data structures in software which can be modified. These prob-
lems are not easily addressed because if we completely removed the ability to alter
applications, execution paths and structures, we would remove desired functionality
and upgrade ability.
2.2.2 Linux & FreeBSD OSs. Although there are differences in implemen-
tation and some functionality between Linux and FreeBSD, their basic architecture is
virtually the same and grows closer together each time there is a development in one
or the other, due to cross pollination of ideas and sharing. According to Silberschatz
et al, Linux was designed for “...speed, efficiency, and standardization” [59]. Accord-
ing to McKusick et al, “the FreeBSD kernel provides four basic facilities: processes, a
filesystem, communications, and system startup” [43]. As can be seen in Figure 2.4,
8
the Linux OS, much like Windows, was created in many modules. The similarities
between Windows and Linux can been seen such that both systems have a kernel
which is surrounded by supporting modules to interact with higher level users and
lower level hardware. However, a difference between Windows and Linux is in regard
to processes and threads. Windows uses threads as its fundamental unit of execution
while Linux does not really distinguish between processes and threads, rather, Linux
generally refers to both as tasks [59].
Figure 2.4: Block Diagram of Linux OS [59].
One of the first techniques used by Linux rootkits was patching which is the
replacement or modification of data, files, binaries, etc. An example of such is the
rootkit T0rn which “replaces login, ifconfig, ps, du, ls, netstat, in.fingered, find and
top” [7] with modified versions of the same files. These modified versions then work to
hide information from the user. For example, the ls command shows a list of what files
are present in the current directory. The modified ls command would filter from view
any files specified by the rootkit. One of the most common techniques for insertion of
a rootkit in Linux and BSD is through a kernel loadable module which uses all three
rootkit techniques. A loadable kernel module allows any information processed by the
system to be modified [7]. This runtime insertion of malicious code into the kernel can
be deterred by turning off the ability to load kernel modules. However, as discussed
previously this can remove functionality that was used for legitimate purposes.
2.2.3 Prevention. Certainly there are configurations that make each of the
various operating systems more secure such as restricting the permissions a user has
9
on their account (ie, user account instead of administrator or root). In the various
UNIX variants, removing the ability to load kernel modules by turning off the func-
tionality slows down the main class of rootkits because, as discussed previously, the
ability to load malicious code would then need to occur in a different way such as
loading through /dev/kmem. The device files /dev/mem and /dev/kmem “allow the
root user to arbitrarily access the contents of physical memory and kernel memory,
respectively [21].” Allowing a root user to access physical and kernel memory gives
all the power desired to rootkit authors that have obtained root permissions through
some vulnerability.
Mandatory access controls (“When a system mechanism controls access to an
object and an individual user cannot alter that access” [5]) can also be added in
some UNIX variants such as Trusted Debian (aka Adamantix) [1], SE Linux [46], and
Trusted BSD [68]. Other functions also exist to help secure a system, FreeBSD for
example, also has a function called “jail” which restricts the user of that jail to its
own associated “processes, files, and network [43].” There are also many software and
hardware suites that help keep our computer systems relatively clean. Firewalls, Host
Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS), Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS),
Anti-Virus(AV), and various Rootkit Detectors. Another example includes the file
flags and four security levels in BSD in order to further secure the kernel. These
security levels are:
“-1. Permanently insecure mode: Kernel runs at secure level 0 at all times.
0. Insecure mode: File flags may be set and reset and devices may be read
from or written to according to their permissions
1. Secure mode: Superuser-setable file flags cannot be turned off. Device
files for system memory /dev/mem, /dev/kmem and for mounted filesys-
tems are read-only.
2. Highly secure mode: Device files for filesystems are always read-only,
whether they are mounted or not. Firewall rules may not be changed” [70].
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2.3 Classifications
Many classifications have been created in order to understand and protect our
networks. Some of the classifications that have been used include: achieved access,
automation, attack type, and attack tree.
2.3.1 Achieved Access. In Table 2.1, we see Incident Categories from Air
Force Instruction 33-138, which shows the categories in which incidents fall based
on the level of achieved access by the attacker. Although this type of classification
system is useful in categorizing what has occurred in order to react it does not cover
how it occurred in order to defend.
2.3.2 Automation. Further classifications can be found, such as classifying
by degree of automation used in the attack: Manual, Semi-Automatic, and Automatic.
Manual attacks are as the name implies, where the human attacker scans, breaks into,
installs, and then uses some attack tool. Semi-automatic attacks, use scripts to do the
scanning, breaking, and installation, which is then followed by the manual instructions
to use the installed tools. Attacks are classified as automatic when the human-in-the-
loop simply starts the attack script and the scanning, breaking, installation, and
exploitation all occur without intervention [37].
2.3.3 Attack Type. Attack types are simply descriptive names given to
attacks such as IP Spoofing, Source Routing, Routing Table Corruption, Denial Of
Service Attacks (DOS), Smurf Attacks, Land Attack, Xmas Tree Attack, Teardrop,
TCP/UDP Diag Services Attacks, Ping of Death, SYN Flood, and Session Hijack-
ing [42].
2.3.4 Attack Tree. An attack tree is simply the graphical representation of
how an attack reaches its goal. Bruce Schneier, the CTO of Counterpane Internet
Security, describes attack trees as follows: “Attack trees provide a formal, methodical
way of describing the security of systems, based on varying attacks. Basically, you
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Table 2.1: Incident Categories (AFI 33-138) [2]
Category Description
I Root-Level Intrusion: An unauthorized person gained root-level
access/privileges on an Air Force computer/information system/network
device.
II User-Level Intrusion: An unauthorized person gained user-level
privileges on an Air Force computer/information system/network
device.
III Attempted Access: An unauthorized person specifically targeted a
service/vulnerability on an Air Force computer/information
system/network device in an attempt to gain unauthorized or increased
access/privileges, but was denied access.
IV Denial of Service (DoS)): Use of an Air Force computer/information
system/network was denied due to an overwhelming volume of
unauthorized network traffic.
V Poor Security Practice: An Air Force computer/information
system/network was incorrectly configured or a user did not follow
established policy.
V I Scan/Probe: Open ports on an Air Force computer/information
system/network device were scanned with no DoS or mission impact.
V II Malicious Logic: Hostile code successfully infected an Air Force
computer/information system/network device. Unless otherwise directed,
only those computers that were infected will be reported as a Category VII
incident.
represent attacks against a system in a tree structure, with the goal as the root node
and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes” [57]. If we can understand how
an attack reaches its goal then it will be easier to stop the achievement of such a goal.
A graphical example of an attack tree for a house burglary is depicted in Figure 2.5
from the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ESISAC) [22].
The reader may note, in Figure 2.5, that “OR” gates are used to show that only
one of the options is needed in order to progress through the attack path. If everyone
robbing a home is: first, entering the town, second, driving down the street, third,
entering the yard, and finally, going through the front door or the side window, then
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Figure 2.5: Example Threat Tree, House Burglary [22]
we focus on the door and the window. Although, no one wants a burgler in town, a
more immediate concern is whether or not the burgler can gain access to the home.
Using an attack tree methodology, instead of only developing a new virus sig-
nature or finding a new way to block each individual new threat, we can identify
the points of ingress in order to protect them better. Concentrating on points of
ingress helps us to get more protection from smaller changes as well as better defense
in depth. Attack trees allow us to more easily explore options for stopping groups
(classes of attacks) in order to make it more difficult for the attacker to achieve their
goal. For example, if we can change the “OR” gate at any of the entry points to an
“AND” gate we can force the attacker to spend more time, money, and/or resources
to achieve the goal.
Furthermore, if our goal as defenders is not only to slow down the attackers but
to completely defend our computer resources then understanding and implementing
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all of these classification techniques together will further our cause and bring us closer
to our goal. For example, continuing with the previous analogy of the burglar, if we
are able to track the burglar’s progress (achieved access) then we can more readily
focus our efforts on what is needed to prevent further access. If we know the level of
automation that is being used by the burglar then we may be able to “out think” him
by doing something that stops automation (perhaps encryption). If we are able to
enumerate the attack types and separate them into those that can hurt us (unknown
defense) and those that don’t (known defense), then we can focus our efforts on the
unknown. Although as quoted by Sun-Tzu, a Chinese general and military strategist
in approximately 400 BC, “Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer”, we
should not forget about the attacks for which we have known defenses. By apply-
ing classification systems we can better understand where to protect our computer
systems.
2.4 Trusted Computing
In an article published by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in October of
2003, Seth Schoen reports “trusted computing initiatives propose to solve some of
today’s security problems through hardware changes to the personal computer” [58].
According to Schoen, trusted computing architectures are being created via Microsoft
Palladium (Next Generation Secure Computing Base), the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG), Intel Lagrande, and AMD Secure Execution Mode (SEM). Some of the ideas
within this new architectural design include memory curtaining, secure input and
output, sealed storage, and remote attestation. Memory curtaining is using hardware
to stop programs from reading or writing to any memory space other than their own.
Secure I/O provides a “secure channel” from the I/O device to the application using
the device such that the application will be able to trust its input rather than worrying
about whether or not it has been altered by malicious software such as rootkits. Sealed
storage uses hardware to generate machine specific keys such that data that resides
on your machine can only be decrypted by your machine and the proper application.
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Remote attestation is creating and sharing a cryptographic hash of your operating
system and any software running on it such that if any changes are made the remote
computers (computers with which you are sharing information) will be able to see
that changes have occurred and not send information until the situation has been
rectified [58].
The first product, which originated from IBM, of the Trusted Computing Group
is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM is a hardware component that
holds “keys used to encrypt data for storage or transmission” [38]. By keeping the
keys and processing of such in a stand alone unit, the ability to sniff or otherwise
guess the decryption keys is dramatically reduced. Research is constantly underway
in the trusted computing area. Currently, the trusted computing group recommends
the following five steps [38] for implementation of trusted computing:
1. Authentication - “the binding of an identity to a subject” [5]
2. Data protection - prevention of unauthorized modification of data, possibly
through encryption or other means
3. Network attestation and platform measurement - the implementation of authen-
tication and data protection accross a network. For example, authenticating the
permissions of the computer to be granted access as well as the patch levels,
firewall setting [38].
4. Application protection - protection of applications from malicious activity by
such things as partitioning memory so the application can not run out of it’s
own space
5. Content protection - digital rights management to grant usage of software only
to authorized persons [38]
Efforts such as these will help improve our computer system defenses against
rootkits by addressing some of the behaviors of rootkits. For example, rootkits rou-
tinely access information “outside” of their own space such as causing an application
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to jump to rootkit code which is addressed by application protection. Data protec-
tion addresses an entire class of rootkits, that of patching. Network attestation will
also give some protection against rootkits by helping verify those connecting to our
computers.
2.5 Exploits vs Patches
As can be seen in Figure 2.6, the path from vulnerabilities being discovered, to
advisories being released (which are followed by patches), is not long but it is long
enough to leave time for the attacker to further compromise a computer system or to
hide their tracks. In July of 2004, Deborah Radcliff of Security Focus reported, “The
time between vulnerability discovery and exploit, has compressed 90 percent during
the past three years the average being 11 days between discovery and exploit (well
below the 23 days most enterprises need to patch)...” [49].
Patching is a useful and important step to protecting our information systems
however, it is not a panacea. Scott Berinato of CSO online has an interesting view,
“Slammer was unstoppable. Which points to a bigger issue: Patching no longer works.
Partly, it’s a volume problem. There are simply too many vulnerabilities requiring too
many combinations of patches coming too fast” [4]. The number of vulnerabilities
continues to increase each year. In 2005, according to cert.org [14], there were 5,990
vulnerabilities reported, which is more than 5 times as many as the year 2000, and
over 35 times more than 1995. While in the first quarter of 2006 alone, there were 1597
vulnerabilities reported [14]. These figures do not account for the probable myriad
of vulnerabilities found that have not been reported which make the total number of
vulnerabilities that exist, increase.
The cost of patching can be estimated using the following formula and example
as given by Pete Lindstrom in Information Security Magazine, “(Hours x Rate x
Systems) + (Patch Failure x (Hours x Rate x Systems)) = Cost to Patch” [39].
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As an example Mr. Lindstrom offers the following: “if it takes an army of
$70/hour technicians one hour to patch a system, and there are 2,000 systems, the
cost is $140,000. If you estimate that 5 percent of the patches fail, and figure an
average of two hours of recovery time (which includes help desk and IT support
activities), that’s 100 systems at $140 each – another $14,000” [39]. This comes to a
total of $154,000 for a single patch for one company that only has 2000 systems. This
can be reduced by using automated patching but shows that patching is expensive. If
the amount of patching can be reduced then the total cost of defense is thus reduced
as well.
Figure 2.6: Exploitation Cycle [44]
2.6 Rootkits
Rootkits, as defined by Chuvakin, are programs used to set up and maintain an
environment [15]. We add to this definition to include, protection and obfuscation of
attack tools which exist on a compromised computer. According to Chuvakin, there
are three main types of rootkits: Binary, kernel and library kits [15].
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However, there are many ways to classify rootkits such as persistant vs memory-
based. Persistant rootkits are rootkits that survive on the system (running) past a
reboot whereas memory-based only rootkits live in memory and thus are effectively
destroyed if a reboot occurs [11]. Joanna Rutkowska in her article, Introducing Stealth
Malware Taxonomy, divides the classification into four types ranging from type 0 to
type 3 [54].
1. Type 0 is described as any malware that uses only documented programming
methods and does not directly interact with the operating system, kernel, or
other any other processes.
2. Type 1 malware “modifies those resources which were designed to be constant,
like e.g. in-memory code sections of the running kernel and/or processes.”
3. Type 2 malware then is the counterpart to type 1 which expects that malware
will modify resources that are not constant such as data sections (changing
pointers in a kernel data structure is cited as an example of type 2).
4. Type 3 malware uses hardware virtualization and exists outside of the system
structures. Rutkowska also created an example of type 3 as a proof of concept
called Blue Pill.
In the following subsections we will briefly explain some rootkit types in order
to give a background on rootkits. This classification system by type is very use-
ful, however, for this thesis and in subsequent chapters we will divide mainly into
three categories inspired by Hoglund et al [8]: Hooking, Patching, and Data Struc-
ture Manipulation (DSM). Each of these categories can occur at two levels, user and
kernel [8].
2.6.1 Binary Rootkits. Binary rootkits replace common binary files with
modified binary files so that when a call to that binary occurs it does as the attacker
wishes rather than as originally designed [15]. An example of such, is the Linux
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rootkit T0rn which “replaces login, ifconfig, ps, du, ls, netstat, in.fingered, find and
top by manipulated versions” [7].
2.6.2 Kernel Rootkits. Kernel rootkits are probably the most dangerous
kind of rootkit in that they have complete control over the machine all the way to
the root level. Kernel rootkits use kernel calls to gain access to hardware rather
than simply system calls which then use kernel calls. These modified kernel calls
then allow the attacker to control what the computer reports to its other “trusted”
applications and resources. One example of how a rootkit installs is via a Loadable
Kernel Module (LKM). An LKM is used in normal functionality of a system to install
various applications and their associated drivers and libraries. However, rootkits also
take advantage of this functionality to insert themselves directly into the kernel. A
computer has various levels of “trust” which are referred to as privileges.
“A privilege in a computer system is a permission to perform an action. Ex-
amples of various privileges include the ability to create a file in a directory, or to
read or delete a file, access a device, or have read or write permission to a socket for
communicating over the Internet” [66]. When working with the Intel x86 architecture
we refer to these privileges as rings. As seen in Figure 2.7, Ring “zero” is where the
kernel operates and has full and unrestricted control. Ring “three” is where the user
has control but must use system calls in order to request information from hardware
at ring zero. Ring “three” is also referred to as “userland” [8].
Of note is that most OSs only use ring zero and ring three thus separating users
into somewhat restricted or not restricted at all, when it could be very useful and
important to have multiple levels of permission. For example, in our banks we don’t
have only a single differentiation between access modes (access to all or access to
some). Rather, we have access to some (e.g., user), access to more than some (e.g.,
teller), access to most (e.g., manager), access to all (e.g., owner with administrator
and manager). If we used all four levels or rings it would add more levels of difficulty
for attackers thus causing them again to use more resources in order to succeed. If
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Figure 2.7: Protection Rings, Intel Developer Manual [16,36]
we can make the amount of effort needed to compromise systems exceed that of the
perceived reward then systems will be more secure because fewer attackers will attack.
One of the advantages or problems (depending on your viewpoint) with kernel
rootkits is that they can cause the system to report what the attacker wishes, whether
it is accurate or not [15]. This includes examples such as: incorrectly showing number
and/or names of processes running, number and/or names of aircraft flying, etc.
As documented by Hoglund et al, “By using a kernel hook, your rootkit will be
on equal footing with any detection software” [8]. By placing a rootkit in the kernel we
gain all of the kernel controls that would be granted to kernel level detection software.
2.6.3 Library Rootkits. Library rootkits work like kernel rootkits although
they run from the user level rather than the kernel level. By modifying libraries
used by kernel calls and system calls, the attacker can redirect or modify original
functionality to get the desired effects of file hiding or process hiding [15].
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2.7 Summary
Classification systems for vulnerabilities/attacks and fingerprinting exist and are
helpful in the defense and fixing of security vulnerabilities. However, classification only
by achieved access, automation, or attack type leaves a defender wondering how to fix
a security flaw. Certainly, these classification techniques give us further information
on what exploit was used, but without an attack tree, it is difficult to pinpoint where
and how to fix a flaw.
As discussed earlier, the time between discovery of a vulnerability and patching
a vulnerability may be long enough to install a rootkit. Once a rootkit is installed
it is much more difficult to remove the compromised control of the system. Once
the rootkit has been installed, the patch may fix the original vulnerability which
allowed access to the machine but with a rootkit now present on the machine it
does not necessarily need the original vulnerability to regain access. The rootkit
could be hiding any number of other attack tools that leave backdoors and other
communication channels open, yet unseen.
This thesis will investigate rootkit hiding techniques (RHTs) and some publicly
available rootkit detection techniques (RDTs). We then create an attack tree from
which we can identify deficiencies in current detection techniques. The identified
deficiencies can then be used by future researchers to increase the state of the art in
computer system defense.
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III. Rootkit Hiding and Finding Techniques
3.1 Chapter Overview
The main goal of a rootkit is to create an environment wherein the attacker
may move about freely and stealthily. This chapter will explain some of the common
stealthing techniques and give some examples of each as well as some of the current
detection techniques. This thesis focuses on the stealth techniques and detection
techniques although it should be noted that prevention should also be considered when
protecting your computer system. Prevention techniques will become very platform
and use specific. For example, in UNIX-like systems, the protection of /dev/kmem
and deactivation of kernel module support will “keep most rootkits outside of the
kernel” [7].
3.2 Rootkit Stealth
In order to be stealthy, a rootkit can and should hide many things, some of
which are processes and files. Three main hiding techniques are hooking, patching,
and data structure manipulation. In general, hooking is changing the execution path
of a call, patching is overwriting information in an application, and data structure
manipulation is changing a data structure. Each of these hiding techniques will be
discussed in further detail. Jan K. Rutkowski [56] refers to a similar separation in
techniques in Figure 3.1.
Another important concept to understand when discussing stealth techniques
is the difference between “hiding in plain sight” (steganography) and “hiding out of
plain sight”. In this thesis we use “hiding” to mean moving or covering information
so that it can not be seen through the desired means (hiding out of plain sight).
Steganography is another technique that can be used to obscure what the user is
seeing so that they do not know that a malicious process exists because they do not
perfectly recognize what they are seeing. Although steganography is normally hiding
information in pictures or other files, an example of steganography in this scenario
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Figure 3.1: Rootkit Technology Picture [56]
would be: changing the name of a rootkit to msdirectx.sys (as is done by the FU
rootkit [27]) so that it looks like a legitimate driver and thus, is hiding in plain sight.
3.2.1 Hooking. Hooking is fairly old but as quoted from Hoglund “...the
rootkit-world hasn’t actually moved away from system hooks. ...most systems don’t
run even the most basic of rootkit detection programs, so even SSDT (system service
descriptor table) hooks are still really effective” [30].
Hooking works by changing the original execution path of some application so
that the information that it receives has passed through the rootkit allowing the
rootkit to scrub the data, effectively allowing the rootkit to hide itself, and anything
else it chooses, from view [8]. An example, is nicely illustrated by Hoglund et al,
in their book “Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel” which is recreated in Fig-
ure 3.2. If we follow the diagram we see that information can be scrubbed by the
rootkit, as desired by the attacker, prior to returning to the source function. First
the function being rooted (source function) is overwritten with a jump to the rootkit
code (the detour), next the rootkit code (the trampoline) is executed. Part of the
rootkit code is to execute the overwritten data from the source function so that the
proper context is in the proper registers when the original code is executed. This is
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then followed by a jump to the original function plus an offset (the target) to account
for the information that was overwritten. When the target function is done executing
it will return the results to the rootkit (the detour/new calling function) which can
then scrub the data that it desires. The rootkit will then return the scrubbed data











Figure 3.2: Temporal ordering of a detoured function [8]
Kernel Level Hooking - The three most common areas to hook in the Windows
kernel, according to Hogland, are the System Service Descriptor/Dispatcher Table
(SSDT), Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), and the I/O Request Packet (IRP) Func-
tion tables [8].
1. The SSDT is the table in Windows which holds a list of all system services by
ID and address. As reported by Prasad Dabak et al in their book Hooking Windows
NT System Services, Windows “system services can be considered the equivalent of
system calls in UNIX” [20]. System services and system calls “represent the funda-
mental interface for any user-mode application or subsystem to the kernel” [20].
2. The IDT is the table which holds the interrupt identifiers and their associ-
ated addresses. An IDT exists both in Windows and UNIX-like operating systems.
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In Windows, “The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is an array of 8 byte interrupt
descriptors in memory devoted to specifying (at most) 256 interrupt service routines.
The first 32 entries are reserved for processor exceptions, and any 16 of the remain-
ing entries can be used for hardware interrupts. The rest are available for software
interrupts” [47].
3. The I/O request packet is where information needed to process an I/O
request is stored within the I/O manager and is used to represent the operation as
it is processed throughout the system [53]. Because the IRP is a location that stores
information about an I/O operation it becomes easy to see how this would be a
valuable place to hook for a rootkit and a place to protect as a defender.
3.2.1.1 Hooking the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT). This
hooking method works on the SSDT and is not constrained to a single application.
According to James Butler and Sherri Sparks in their article, Windows Rootkits of
2005, the SSDT is where the “actual implementation of the operating system functions
are contained” [10]. SSDT hooking works by replacing the addresses of ZW* functions
with the address of rootkit code (“ZW routines provide a set of system entry points
that parallel some of the executive’s system services. Calling a ZW routine from
kernel-mode code results in a call to the corresponding system service” [17]). This
gives the opportunity for the rootkit code to manipulate information that would have
been returned to any calling application. ZW* functions are functions exported by
the kernel for usage by other kernel functions and device drivers. When a ZW*
function is called, usually by an NT* function (system call) it returns the address
corresponding to the NT* function which was stored in the SSDT [8]. As can be seen
in Figure 3.3, the hook simply overwrites the address of the hooked kernel function
with the address of the rootkit so that any application calling the hooked function will
have it’s execution path pass through the rootkit giving the rootkit the opportunity
to scrub or alter data.
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Figure 3.3: Example SSDT Hook
3.2.1.2 Hooking the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). This hooking
method works on interrupts and is not constrained to a single application or a single
operating system. IDT hooks work fundamentally differently than SSDT hooks in
that with an SSDT hook the idea is to insert the rootkit into the execution loop so
that it can scrub the output of a legit function, thus returning incorrect/incomplete
data to the calling application. The IDT hook, on the other hand, does not insert
in the execution loop. Rather, the IDT hook breaks the loop and calls the rootkit
code instead of the originally intended code as can be seen in Figure 3.4. This allows
the rootkit to identify that there is a call from a particular application so that it can
identify and then allow or block. This method works by replacing the address of a
legitimate interrupt in the IDT with an entry to some rootkit code [8]. This causes
the rootkit code to be called every time the interrupt occurs. Altering the IDT works
both in Windows and in Linux simply by changing the address of a legitimate jump
to the address of rootkit code in the IDT.
3.2.1.3 Hooking the I/O Request Packet (IRP) Function Tables. IRP
hooks, just like IDT hooks, are not returned to so creating a hook that calls to rootkit
code is necessary to alter information coming from the intended driver. An illustration
of an IRP hook can be seen in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Example IDT Hook
Figure 3.5: Example IRP Hook [9]
Figure 3.6, shows a normal device driver physical structure. Once hooked the
diagram would change the “Device Drivers” box to “rootkit driver”. It is necessary
to write a completion function so that the information from the original device driver
can be sanitized [8].
A common theme among the Kernel Mode hooks is that they each overwrite an
address in a kernel data structure with a rootkit address and they are not application
specific.
User Level Hooking can also be done from the user level or “Userland” using
API hooking. API hooking is overwriting or modifying sections of files/processes used
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Figure 3.6: Device Driver Physical Structure, Microsoft [18]
by an application to do other than intended purposes or to report other than accurate
information.
There are two common kinds of userland API hooking processes; Import Address
Table (IAT) hooking, and Inline function hooking. The IAT is a data structure
belongs to and resides within the address space of most application’s. The IAT holds
the imported addresses of functions to which the application plans to jump. Inline
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function hooking is simply placing “extra” instructions into a function. The resultant
execution path of inline function hooking can be seen in Figure 3.2.
3.2.1.4 Import Address Table (IAT) Hooking. IAT hooking works like
SSDT hooking except it operates on the IAT table rather than the SSDT table. IAT
is also a hook per application rather than a hook for all applications. The SSDT
holds the addresses of system services that applications use, while each application
has its own IAT. An example of IAT hooking can be seen in Figure 3.7. Normal flow
would be: Application, IAT, called function. This can occur because the IAT can be
overwritten to jump to the rootkit instead of the intended function. This allows the
rootkit to be the caller of the intended function which gives the ability to clean/alter
the returned information [8].
Figure 3.7: Normal execution path vs. hooked execution path
for an IAT hook [9]
3.2.1.5 Inline function hooking. Inline function hooking is basically
the same thing as IAT hooking except the control of the target function is taken by
replacing the first 5 bytes of the target function with a jump to the rootkit function.
The rootkit function then calls the target function using the previously saved first
5 bytes. In this way the target function will do its intended operation but then
return the results to the rootkit rather than the calling application. The rootkit
will then modify the data as needed and return the erroneous results to the calling
application [8]. Figure 3.2, shows how the inline hooking would work. The actual
usage of inline function hooking would look like Table 3.1, which shows the normal
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preamble of a Windows function and the modified preamble. Inline function hooking
is very similar to the following rootkit concept which is patching.
Table 3.1: Inline Function Hook [10]
Original Preamble
Code Bytes Assembly
8bff mov edi, edi
55 push ebp
8bec mov ebp, esp
Modified Preamble
Code Bytes Assembly
e9 xx xx xx xx jmp xxxxxxxx
...
3.2.2 Patching. Patching is overwriting a binary such that it performs in a
different way than it originally performed. An example of malicious patching would be
to analyze a program to find where the conditionals are located. One such conditional
could be the Jump if Not Zero (JNZ) instruction which can be used to stop access
to a program if the key entered is not correct/valid. This can easily be patched
with the use of a hexadecimal editor. We simply search for the appropriately located
hexidecimal value 75 (the JNZ assembly instruction) and change it to hexidecimal
value EB (the JMP assembly instruction). This change effectively says “jump to the
next instruction even if the right key is not entered” thus making the “nag screen” no
longer appear. Patching is also used to improve or fix otherwise incomplete/incorrect
code.
3.2.3 Data Structure Manipulation. Data Structure Manipulation (DSM) is
modifying a data structure such that it no longer works in the same way. An example
of DSM is Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM). Other RHTs remove data or
change data while DSM is changing the structure such that the data still exists it is
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just not seen or used in the same fashion. An excellent example of this technique is
DKOM as implemented by FU which is described in Section 3.2.3.1,
3.2.3.1 Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM). One of the
objects within the Windows kernel that can be modified is the executive process
block (EPROCESS) which contains information about its associated process as well
as pointers to other needed data structures [53]. In this scenario used by FU and
FUTo rootkits, DKOM modifies the doubly linked list of processes such that the
pointers in the list, point around the process to be hidden, effectively removing it
from the list. Once the process has been removed from the list it can still continue
to execute because the execution occurs through the associated threads rather than
from one process to the next. This does, however, effectively remove the process from
any queries that attempt to walk this linked list of processes.
Figure 3.8: Direct Kernel Object Manipulation [8]
The removal of the EPROCESS block from the list occurs by making the forward
link (FLINK) and backward link (BLINK) pointers, in the EPROCESS block of the
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process to be hidden, point to each other, while making the neighboring blocks point
to each other. The EPROCESS block is accessed by using the kernel processor control
block to view the current thread which points to the ETHREAD block, which then
points to the EPROCESS block. Each EPROCESS block is connected via a doubly
linked list to other EPROCESS blocks. Figure 3.8, shows the modification of the
FLINK and BLINK pointers [16].
3.2.3.2 Future DSM Targets. Data structure manipulation is one of
the cutting edge rootkit techniques and as such will continue to develop. One obvious
location for implementation of such techniques will be in the scheduler. Currently
there is a proof of concept (used for detection) called Klister, developed by Joanna
Rutkowska in 2003. Klister allows the scheduler/dispatcher lists to be read, showing
the currently running threads which are used to schedule time on the processor [12,13].
Threads can then be checked to see which process they belong to, thus showing an
accurate view of which processes are running regardless of hiding techniques to date
such as DKOM. This RDT could be overcome at least in theory by manipulating the
scheduler/dispatcher such that the desired thread(s) are hidden.
3.2.4 Virtual Machine and Virtual Memory. Virtual machine and virtual
memory rootkits are some of the most cutting edge techniques. Virtual machine
rootkits, such as Blue Pill by Joanna Rutkowska [54, 55], seek to turn the host OS
into a virtual machine by lifting it and inserting the rootkit below as the host OS. In
this way the rootkit would have access to anything and everything in the now virtual
OS but the virtual OS would have no indication of the rootkit’s presence. Virtual
memory rootkits seek to monitor their own memory section address space such that
when another process tries to read it they are redirected. An example of virtual
memory rootkits is cited and explained in further detail in Section 3.2.9.
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3.2.5 Hardware. Although inserting rootkits at the hardware level may be
feasible, as documented by John Heasman in his paper Implementing and Detecting
a PCI Rootkit [28], for this thesis, we will not delve into as much detail on the issue.
Summary of Stealth Techniques - As discussed earlier the three categories used
by rootkits to hide are Hooking (changing the execution path), Patching (overwriting
an executable), and Data Structure Manipulation (changing the data/structure of an
object). These same techniques are used to attack both Windows and Linux operating
systems. In Figure 3.9 we can see how the three categories fit. All software exists
as data (binary code) which can potentially be overwritten or patched (inner-most
circle). This data is generally in some format, object or construct of some sort (list,
array, etc) which is what is hooked, in order to change the execution path (middle
circle). These constructs all interact in one form or another with their environment
such as the OS which is their data structure. This data structure can potentially be
manipulated (outer circle). For example, changing or removing pointers to an object.
It is important as a defender and an attacker to understand where all the tables with
important data exist, and where control exists. Hardware certainly puts a slightly
different spin on these categories but still roughly maintains these categories simply
by containing these categories within a new set of hardware. For example, if a PCI
card is added to a machine in order to protect the machine, the PCI card itself would
have these three categories within itself. The three categories would also then exist
on the same machine but outside of the PCI card thus giving two distinct locations
to check.
The following sections will give some examples of the three categories of rootkits.
3.2.6 Rootkit Examples - Hooking. As previously described, hooking works
by changing the original execution path of some application so that the information
that it receives has passed through the rootkit allowing the rootkit to scrub the data,
effectively allowing the rootkit to hide itself and anything else it chooses from view [8].
The following are some examples of hooking rootkits:
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Figure 3.9: Rootkit Hiding Categories
3.2.6.1 AFX - Windows RK. Hides by hooking the SSDT as described
previously. AFX, as will be shown later, can be detected by other rootkits at the same
level or by checking other areas of the operating system for existence of AFX [62].
3.2.6.2 Vanquish - Windows RK. Works by hooking of API calls as
well as patching. Once the API is hooked the function is patched so that the hook can
subsequently be “undone” [69]. The hook no longer needs to exist once the function
is patched because the function will carry out the rootkit functionality due to the
patch.
3.2.6.3 Hacker Defender - Windows RK. The readme file for hacker
defender describes hacker defender as follows: “... rewrite few memory segments in
all running processes. ...able to hide files, processes, system services, system drivers,
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registry keys and values, open ports, cheat with free disk space. ...also masks its
changes in memory and hides handles of hidden processes. ...installs hidden backdoors,
register as hidden system service and installs hidden system driver” [32]. This rootkit
works by hooking various API functions to hook ALL processes in the system [32].
3.2.6.4 Adore BSD 0.34 - BSD RK. Adore is a kernel loaded module
that is used to hide files, processes and network connections. It uses a second module
to delete itself from the kernel data structures. The SSDT method described earlier
is used to insert the rootkit via the overwriting of 15 system calls [7]. Subsequent
versions of Adore such as Adore-NG 1.41 use the same kernel module loading but
then infect other areas of the kernel such as the virtual filesystem layer such that it
does not have to hide itself because it becomes part of other modules [7].
3.2.7 Rootkit Examples - Patching. Patching is overwriting a binary such
that it performs in a different way than it originally performed. The following are
some examples of patching rootkits:
3.2.7.1 eEye Bootrootkit - Windows RKs. Created by Derek Soeder
and Ryan Permeh of eEye Digital Security, this proof of concept proves use of the
boot sector to create a rootkit. It uses a hook into the interrupt 13h in order to patch
the OS loader and then hooks ndis.sys [61] which is the Windows Network Driver
Interface Specification. NDIS.sys, according to related forums, holds a “collection of
routines that applications can invoke to perform network-related operations” [50].
3.2.7.2 SucKIT 1.3b - Linux RK. SucKIT is a Linux rootkit designed
by Silvio Cesare [15] and includes mechanisms for reboots and a backdoor. This
rootkit is listed in the patching section because majority of its techniques rely on
patching however, as you will see many of the ideas from other techniques are used.
This rootkit installs itself by doing a search on the memory of the system to find
the location of kmalloc() (the function used to allocate memory in the kernel) and
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the SSDT. Once found, the address of kmalloc() is placed in an unused entry of the
SSDT. The entry that now exists in the SSDT is called and used to allocate kernel
memory, and the rootkit is subsequently loaded into that memory space. The SSDT
entry used is then overwritten to jump to the rootkit space. The /sbin/init file is also
overwritten or modified in order to reload this rootkit after a reboot. However, this
rootkit also copies the original file before overwriting so that when a query is made
to the file, the rootkit can redirect the query to the original but renamed file. This
saving and redirecting stops detection via a simple checksum. While using patching as
a means for loading, this rootkit also takes advantage of the SSDT to hook 24 system
calls. However, the implementation of the hook is slightly different. The SSDT is
actually copied and then modified. The IDT is then hooked to have subsequent
system calls jump to the modified SSDT. This stops detection of the rootkit by SSDT
inspection [7].
3.2.7.3 T0rn 8 - Linux RK. T0rn hides process information by patch-
ing system libraries such as libproc.a in linux systems. Libproc.a is “used for relaying
the process information from the kernelspace (via /proc file system) to user space
utilities such as /bin/ps and top” [15].
3.2.8 Rootkit Examples - Data Structure Manipulation. DSM modifies a
data structure such that it no longer works in the same way. The following are
examples of DSM rootkits:
3.2.8.1 FU and FUTo - Windows RKs. FU and FUTo hide by using
DKOM to redirect pointers within the EPROCESS block in Windows OSs as de-
scribed in Section 3.2.3.1. A possible way to subvert this hiding technique is to follow
each thread from the Kernel Process Control Block (KPCB) to its Ethread and sub-
sequently to its EProcess, thus finding each process by iterating through threads in
the KPCB rather than processes in the EProcess blocks. A similar concept is shown
in “Klister” as previously mentioned.
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3.2.9 Rootkit Examples - Virtual Memory.
3.2.9.1 Shadow Walker - Windows RKs. Shadow Walker uses virtual
memory to hide itself and its malicious processes from detection. As reported by
James Butler and Sherri Sparks, Shadow Walker is a proof of concept that covers
three concerns in virtual memory [11]. First, it detects when something other than
itself is attempting to read its memory space. This is done by identifying the dif-
ference between read, write, and execute. Differentiating between read, write, and
execute (read/execute, write/execute) is accomplished by marking the page table en-
tries (PTEs) as “non present” and hooking the page fault handler. This allows Shadow
Walker to monitor access to these pages. Once it has been clearly identified which
of these is being used, the RK must be able to fake the read or send back erroneous
information to would-be detection utilities. If the access is a read access, Shadow
Walker returns erroneous information to the application, otherwise Shadow Walker
runs itself as intended. The last thing addressed by Shadow Walker is that there is
little identifiable performance degradation because the increase in the number of page
faults generated is minimal. [11]
Other UNIX based rootkits include: (usermode)-lkr, ark, (kernelmode)-Knark(written
by Creed).
As can be seen in Table 3.2, there are many rootkits. Each rootkit studied fits
into at least one of the three categories, namely hooking, patching, or DSM. However,
as can also be seen in the table there are at least two rootkits which have treaded
on new territory, that of VM and Hardware. Both of these new territories still fall
within hooking, patching and DSM as described earlier but because of the newness
were left in the table as separate entries.
3.3 Rootkit Detection
There are many techniques to detect rootkits, however, as stated elegantly by
the writers of www.hxdef.org “For an attacker one security hole is enough to win
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Table 3.2: Rootkit Examples
Rootkit Hooking Patching DSM VM Hardware
AFX X X
Vanquish X X












Shadow Walker X X
Blue Pill X X








the game. One can say the role of attacker is easier. But if you want to fight the
attacker you can’t produce an antirootkit solution that just fixes or protects one weak
point. You have to fix all those points. What’s more, you can’t have weak points
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in that solution.” [31] Rootkits are constantly evolving and improving thus rootkit
detection methods must get better and more complete. There may or may not exist a
single rootkit detector that can find all rootkits. James Butler and Sherri Sparks, in
their article Windows Rootkits of 2005 [12], divide rootkit detection techniques into
five categories: signature based, behavioral/heuristic, crossview, integrity based and
hardware detection [12].
1. Signature based detection is scanning data for a pattern which comprises a
“fingerprint” that is unique to a particular entity [11].
2. Behavioral/heuristic based detection seeks to identify actions or patterns that
are abnormal to system operation. These detection techniques “work by recognizing
deviations in “normal” system patterns or behaviors” [11].
3. Crossview based detection uses the idea of data redundancy (the existence
of equivalent data in more than one location) to find “answers” from multiple sources
that should be the same in order to identify discrepancies [11]. An example of such is
a child asking her mother for permission to go to the park and then asking her father
permission for the same thing. The two answers should be the same; however, the
difference in answers is what is exploited by the child.
4. Integrity based detection compares a known good entity with a suspected
entity in order to verify the correctness/accurateness of the suspect entity. An example
of such is comparing “a current snapshot of the filesystem or memory with a known,
trusted baseline” [11].
5. Hardware based detection uses a piece of hardware to implement one or
more detection techniques such as signature, heuristic, crossview, or integrity based
detection while separating itself from the suspected operating system [11]. Hardware
detection makes it more difficult for the attacking entity to corrupt the results of the
hardware.
As important as each of these categories are; we have come to a different solution
for categorization. If it is possible to classify, such that a taxonomy is developed, then
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we will be able to move more quickly in our research to detect “all” rootkits because
“all rootkits” would fit into the taxonomy. In an effort to move toward this taxonomy
we propose the following categorization. We propose detection classes, techniques,
and implementations each of which will have its subcategories.
Detection classes give categories that show ways in which it might be possible to
detect. Surely there may be classes that we have not yet discovered, but to date we see
these classes as: Static (Analysis/Detection based on the knowledge of characteristics
possessed by an entity such as a rootkit) and Behavioral (Analysis/Detection based
on the behavior or lack of absence of behavior of an entity).
Detection techniques are the subsets of detection classes which describe how the
detection classes may work. Subsets of the static class are: signature (analysis/detec-
tion of an entity through identified patterns or sequences) and integrity (analysis/de-
tection of an entity through verification and comparison of known good patterns or
sequences with suspect patterns or sequences). Subsets of the behavioral class are:
anomaly (analysis/detection of and entity through identification of unknown behav-
ior) and signature (as previously defined). Each of these techniques can take on an
aspect of time via a snapshot of past, present or future states.
Detection implementations are the ways in which we may implement detection
techniques or combinations of detection techniques as is the case with crossview. The
identified implementations to date are: crossview (the comparing of two or more
inputs, whether from the same technique or various, in order to achieve detection),
remote attestation (comparing “outside” information with information on a “suspect”
machine), cognitive/human, hardware, software, and memory tracking (detection of
anomalies via known memory behaviors).
We arrive at this categorization by analyzing detection starting with Figure 3.10.
In this graph we divide detection into two areas; “What it is” (What are we trying
to detect), and “What it is doing” (What is the entity, that we are trying to detect,
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doing). The first branch is then followed further to identify two ways of detecting
“What it is”; Is it there, or can we verify that it is not there.
Figure 3.10: Detection Classification 1
“What it is” refers to what is the rootkit which we are trying to detect and a
static view (snapshot) of either what it looked like in the past, what it currently looks
like, or what it will look like in the future. This requires the knowledge of the rootkit
and what it looks like at various stages. “What it is doing” refers to the actions or
behavior of the rootkit or the actions and behaviors caused by the rootkit (the actions
and behaviors of the surrounding system). Figure 3.11, shows the same graph with
the new classes and techniques inserted. Figure 3.12 adds detection implementations
and other known inputs to a system.
Other known inputs to a system that might help in detection could be intel-
ligence (obtained from other sources, i.e., someone said there is a rootkit on my
machine), witness (the data, object, or structure affected by the victim), victim (the
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Figure 3.11: Detection Classification 2
data, object, or structure that was manipulated), attacker (the manipulator of data,
object or structure), and outside sources (such as a news report or other information).
If we incorporate all of our classes, techniques, implementations and other inputs
into a graph and connect them via arrows showing inputs we obtain a very busy
Figure 3.12 which shows how each of the classes, techniques, and implementations
interconnect.
3.3.1 Behavioral Detection Class. Behavioral based detection seeks to iden-
tify actions or patterns that are abnormal to system operation. These detection tech-
niques “work by recognizing deviations in normal system patterns or behaviors” [11].
A lack of pattern or action is also a behavior, but it is a behavior of the system rather
than a behavior of the entity being investigated. For example, if an application is
launched that should create a particular pattern and it does not create said pattern
then that is anomalous. Behavioral detection uses two main techniques: anomaly and
signature. Behavioral detection can also be an input to many detection implementa-
tions such as: Crossview, hardware, software, cognitive/human, remote attestation,
and memory tracking.
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Figure 3.12: Detection Classification 3
3.3.2 Static Detection Class. The static detection class is defined by what
the target entity is comprised of or its attributes, such as code. Static detection
currently has two techniques, signature and integrity. Signature based detection is
defined as a particular set (predefined set) of instructions or code which are to be
found and acted upon (i.e., identified, blocked, removed) [23, 33]. This set may be
a sequence of instructions or a pattern of instructions. Integrity based detection
compares a known good entity with a suspected entity in order to verify the correct-
ness/accurateness of the suspect entity. An example of such is comparing “a current
snapshot of the filesystem or memory with a known, trusted baseline” [11]. These
two techniques within the static detection class show two views, that of detection of
known bad via looking for the bad and detection of bad via verifying known good.
One drawback to signature detection is the fact that it works via the blacklist
(i.e., blocks a specific list of disallowed items, ie,. processes, actions, email addresses)
methodology such that you must know of the attack before blocking it. The two
limitations cited by James Foster of Global Security Solution Development and the
glossary developed by Imperva, Data Security for the Data Center, are: 1. “They
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are prone to false positives without extensive tuning”, and 2. “They are not effective
at detecting many unknown attacks on custom or internally developed code” [23,
33]. However, the counterpart to blacklist is whitelist (blocks all but a specific list
of allowed items, ie,. processes, actions, email addresses, etc,) which is analogous
to integrity based detection. By including both signature (analogy:blacklist) and
integrity (analogy:whitelist) in the static detection class it seems that we have covered
static analysis.
It is our hypothesis that rootkits must hide from both classes of detection,
namely Behavioral and Static, in order to be completely stealthy. A rootkit does not
necessarily need to hide from both in order to be effective but in order to obtain
complete stealth it must address both and be at the lowest ring/highest level. The
term “lowest ring/highest level” refers to the protection rings in Figure 2.7. If we
do not attempt detection in all classes then a rootkit could achieve stealthiness by
only implementing the class that is not challenged. For example, a particular rootkit
could use metamorphic code in order to subvert signature detection and hook the
integrity scan report in order to subvert the results which would in effect defeat the
static detection class which shows that if behavior is not checked then we will not be
able to detect such a rootkit.
One way in which some rootkits can be found, as mentioned by Hoglund et al.
is by looking for an image on a system, which falls into the static detection class,
“This approach is still used by most anti-virus vendors” [8]. Hoglund also suggests
that “All software must ‘live’ in memory somewhere” [8]. which means that detection
can also be implemented in the forms of guarding and scanning.
Guarding vs Scanning - Guarding is the enumeration and protection of all im-
portant “assets”. This can be compared to whitelists (a specific list of allowed items,
ie,. processes, actions, email addresses, etc,) and the integrity detection technique.
Guarding then disallows anything not on the “approved” whitelist. Scanning, on the
other hand, is looking for a particular “signature” among the unknown events and
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possibly within the known events (to verify the known events’ integrity). Scanning
requires a “signature” which assumes apriori knowledge of the intrusion or of a par-
ticular attack method [8]. Scanning could then be compared to blacklists and the
signature technique of the static class.
Both guarding and scanning are legitimate and useful techniques to protecting
a system and when used in conjunction with one another will raise the defenses of a
given system.
Rootkit techniques can be used to detect rootkits. For example, the usage of a
rootkit to detect other rootkits. If we use a rootkit to report rather than to hide we
may be able to subvert a malicious rootkit at the same level by creating a somewhat
“secure channel” for reporting back to the user.
The lower detour function box in Figure 3.13 (step 4), shows how it might be
possible to export the unmodified data of the target program to a different desti-
nation in order to maintain data integrity and compare against the modified source
application data, creating a crossview. Further details of this detection technique will
be discussed in Section 4.8.
3.3.3 Rootkit Detection Examples - Behavioral.
3.3.3.1 VICE. Vice detects the presence of hidden hooks by installing
its own device driver to check the SSDT for pointers that do not resolve to ntoskrnl.exe
which (“provides the Microkernel and Executive layers of the Windows NT kernel
space, and is responsible for various system services such as hardware virtualisation,
process and memory management”) [67]. It also checks devices in driver.ini with
the IRP table, and applications looking for IAT hooks in every DLL. This method of
detection is very robust when looking for hooks of this type. However, Vice is subject
to subversion through other techniques such as DSM [12].
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Figure 3.13: Trampoline Function with Modification [8]
3.3.3.2 Patchfinder. Patchfinder is a proof of concept tool created
by Joanna Rutkowska. Patchfinder works by puting the x86 processor into single
step mode and counting every instruction on a clean machine and comparing the
instruction count to that of a potentially compromised machine. Through statistics
Rutkowska claims that rootkit detection can occur because the application of a his-
togram shows shifts in peak instruction counts on an infected system versus a non
infected system. Differently stated, a clean system will have a peak in instruction
counts at a particular spot in execution and an infected system will have a different
or shifted peak. However, the height of the peak may vary, normally, because of the
different paths of execution that could exist [12].
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3.3.3.3 System Virginity Verifier. System Virginity Verifier, created as
another proof of concept by Joanna Rutkowska, works much like VICE by “comparing
important system libraries and drivers on disk with their corresponding loaded images
in memory” [12].
3.3.3.4 Copilot. Copilot is a hardware detection tool in the form of a
PCI card which implements behavioral and signature based detection techniques on
key tables and functions. Copilot effectively solves (at least for now) the need to have
a secure channel for reporting back to a user by maintaining all of the processing of
information on its own CPU using Direct Memory Access (DMA) to scan for rootkits,
and its own network interface to securely send the information to the requestor [12].
3.3.4 Rootkit Detection Examples - Signature.
3.3.4.1 Klister. Klister finds processes by iterating through the sched-
uler to find all threads that are scheduled and comparing that list to a higher level
view of running processes thus allowing a crossview to find discrepancies. A crossview
uses two or more views of the same data and compares the results in order to identify
discrepancies. Klister is a proof of concept for the Windows 2000 platform created by
Joanna Rutkowska [12]. It is claimed to be subvertible at least in theory by changing
the scheduler code or by using virtual machine technology. However, both of these
subversion techniques not only raise the level of difficulty for rootkit creation but have
an inherent problem in that they increase processor workload, thus allowing detection
via delay issues.
3.3.4.2 Rootkit Revealer. Rootkit revealer seeks to find persistent
rootkits (those that remain between reboots) by comparing the registry hive (“com-
prises a set of files, called hives, that are stored on the hard drive” [41]) and the
filesystem to identify files that do not belong [12]. This method of detection can
easily be subverted through redirection of queries to the file system files and queries
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to the registry. According to the technichal paper, An Analysis of Forensic Tools in
Detecting Rootkits and Hidden Processes by Todd et al [3], Rootkit Revealer was able
to detect AFXRootkit and Hacker Defender.
3.3.4.3 Strider GhostBuster. Strider Ghostbuster seeks to find rootk-
its by comparing high level API calls and a manually parsed version of the filesystem
to identify files that do not belong [12]. As with many of these detection techniques,
this method of detection can easily be subverted through use of hooking and redirec-
tion. Therefore, it is important that the information obtained is verified to be correct
possibly through the use of trusted computing methodology.
3.3.4.4 Tripwire. Tripwire accomplishes detection through integrity
checking of the disk. In order for this to succeed the user must take a clean view of their
disk prior to operation and then any subsequent checks are compared against the clean
view. Each view or check uses a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) hash value to record
the state of the disk. Any variations to the CRC in future checks from the original
check constitutes a flag or detection. Subversion of this technique is accomplished
through in memory rootkits as opposed to on disk (persistent) rootkits [12].
3.3.4.5 Blacklight. Blacklight works by querying every possible Pro-
cess Identification (PID) number, which they call Process Identification Brute Force
(PIDB), and comparing the results with a crossview of a higher level call to mark
any discrepancies as hidden. The following quote from an article published on un-
informed.org by Peter Silberman and C.H.A.O.S. clearly describes how Blacklight
works:
“Now we have a complete picture of how Blacklight detects hidden pro-
cesses: Blacklight starts looping through the range of valid process IDs,
0 through 0x41DC. Blacklight calls OpenProcess on every possible PID.
OpenProcess calls NtOpenProcess. NtOpenProcess calls PsLookupPro-
cessByProcessId to verify the process exists. PsLookupProcessByProces-
sId uses the PspCidTable to verify the processes exists. NtOpenProcess
calls ObOpenObjectByPointer to get the handle to the process. If Open-
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Process was successful, Blacklight stores the information about the process
and continues to loop. Once the process list has been created by exhaust-
ing all possible PIDs. Blacklight compares the PIDB list with the list it
creates by calling CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
is a Win32 API that takes a snapshot of all running processes on the sys-
tem. A discrepancy between the two lists implies that there is a hidden
process. This case is reported by Blacklight” [63].
According to the technichal paper, An Analysis of Forensic Tools in Detecting Rootkits
and Hidden Processes by Todd et al [3], BlackLight was able to detect AFXRootkit,
Hacker Defender, Vanquish, FU and FUTo.
3.3.4.6 Ice Sword. Ice Sword, was created by a Chinese programmer
by the alias of pjf [40]. It is believed to function using the same techniques as
Blacklight for process detection [63]. However, an apparent advantage Ice Sword
has over it’s counterpart is that it is more robust and includes capabilities to detect
“hidden processes, services, drivers, files, ports, and registry settings” [3]. According
to the technichal paper, An Analysis of Forensic Tools in Detecting Rootkits and
Hidden Processes by Todd et al [3], Ice Sword was able to detect AFXRootkit, Hacker
Defender, Vanquish, FU and FUTo.
3.3.4.7 GMER. GMER scans for hidden processes, threads, modules,
services, files, alternate data streams, registry keys, SSDT hooks, IDT hooks, IRP
calls, and inline hooks. GMER also monitors creation of processes, driver loading,
library loading, file functions, registry entries, and TCP/IP connections [48].
The area of rootkit detection has grown considerably and there are a very large
number of detectors. Due to the high number of detectors available, not all were able
to be covered due to time contraints. However, a list of some that were found are
listed in Table 3.3. Some were found mentioned in various articles but not described
fully and some were found at sites such as majorgeeks.com [3].
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Table 3.3: Rootkit Detection Examples
Rootkit Detector Static Behavioral
Klister (Rutkowska) X
Rootkit Revealer (Sysinternals) X
Strider Ghostbuster (Microsoft) X
Tripwire X
F-Secure Blacklight (F-Secure) X
Ice Sword (XFocus) X
Patchfinder X
Vice X
System Virginity Verifier (Rutkowska) X
CoPilot X
Other Rootkit Detectors include: RKDetector, find hidden service, Flister, Kill
hide services, Kernel hidden process/module checker, modGreper, RegDatXP, Task-
Info, and bluestone.
Windows RK Detectors include: Aries Sony Rootkit Remover(lavasoft), Archon
Scanner(x-solve), AVG AntiRootkit(Grisoft), Avira Rootkit Detection(Avira), Dark
Spy(CardMagic and Wowocock), Helios(MIEL e-Security), HiddenFinder(Wenpoint),
HookExplorer (iDefense), Panda Anti-Rootkit Tucan (Panda Software), Process Mas-
ter (Backfaces), Rootkit Detective (McAfee Avert Labs), Rootkit Buster (Trend Mi-
cro), RootKit Hook Analyzer (Resplendence), RootkitShark (Advances.com), Rootkit
Uncover (Bit Defender), Rootkit Unhooker (UG North), SEEM (Al, nunki), Sophos
Antirootkit (Sophos), and Unhackme (Greatis).
Linux/BSD RK Detectors include: chkrootkit(Murilo and Jessen), Zeppoo (Zep-
poo), and Rootkit Hunter (Boelen).
Mac RK Detectors include: OS X Rootkit Hunter (Christian Hornung).
Summary - The detection classes, techniques, and implementations with their
associated examples all give us a better view into how rootkits can be detected and
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where we may find potential deficiencies. The following chapter will show attack
trees and defense trees as examples of how rootkits hide and are detected in order to
help further identify what these deficiencies may be. It also illustrates via ideas and
experimentation some ways to further the state of the art.
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IV. Experimentation and Results
4.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, in order to further explain and classify rootkit hiding techniques,
we develop an attack tree and a defense tree which will help to identify deficiencies
in current detection, help focus future research of hiding and detection, as well as
important concepts for defense. We also explain and define an experiment which
shows how a rootkit can be used to defend against other rootkits of the same type in
order to springboard future defensive techniques.
4.2 Rootkit Attack Tree
In Figure 4.1 we have created an example of how an attacker might achieve
a degree of stealth via following one of the branches of this attack tree through its
associated OR gates. We note that in order to obtain a degree of stealth the attack
need only pick one of the shown attack paths. For example, the FU rootkit [26]
modifies the SSDT which provides some stealth because the SSDT is relied upon by
many programs to provide information about existing processes.
Stealth
Ready List
AttackTree for Rootkit Hiding
UserDispatcher/scheduler Kernel Objects APIsVM





Future -- Bleeding Edge -- Cutting Edge------------------ Current ------------------------------------- Older
Rootkit Technology Timeline
Figure 4.1: Attack Tree 2: Rootkit Hiding Techniques
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From Figure 4.1 a hierarchical view of complete stealth can be derived and is
shown in Figure 4.2. Thus, for complete stealth an attacker must descend to the
lowest level of stealth. However, the lowest level of stealth needed is dictated by
the level of defense being implemented. Furthermore, descending to the lowest level
without regard to the higher levels is also not sufficient; the attacker must keep in mind
the 30,000 foot view in order to maintain stealthiness. For example, if an attacker
descends to the lowest level of stealth (perhaps using a VM technique such as Blue
Pill) but forgets to hide from both the signature and behavioral detection classes
with all of their techniques and implementations then they can still be theoretically
detected. In this case, although popular belief and albeit, very good analysis, would
suggest that Blue Pill would be “...virtually ‘100% undetectable’ !” [54], this does not

























































Figure 4.2: Rootkit Hierarchy
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4.3 Rootkit Defense Tree
A defense tree is the counterpart to an attack tree, and is used simply to identify
what needs to be defended in a computer system. In order to have complete protec-
tion, all of the branches of the tree must be checked as can be seen in Figure 4.3 which
uses AND gates to depict that all branches must be addressed.
No Stealth
Ready List
UserDispatcher/scheduler Kernel Objects APIsVM





Future ---------------------------- Bleeding Edge -- Cutting Edge---------- Current ------------------------- Older
Rootkit Detection Technology Timeline
Defense Tree
Figure 4.3: Rootkit Defense Tree
However, some branches can potentially be checked via checking other branches
or combinations of branches. An example of defense tree usage is given in Figure 4.4,
with Klister. By using a view of the API branch and a view of the scheduler/dispatcher
(the part of the operating system that decides what is to run next and for how long
based on priorities), Klister is able to effectively discover what is occuring in one
branch without directly searching it because the dispatcher should hold an accurate
list of what is running which can be compared against what “should be” accurate
in the API list. Any discrepancies can then be shown as hidden processes. This
technique cuts out the DKOM technique used by FU and FUTo by working around
it. However, as mentioned earlier, all branches should still be checked because if the






UserDispatcher/scheduler Kernel Objects APIsVM





Future ---------------------------- Bleeding Edge -- Cutting Edge---------- Current ------------------------- Older









Figure 4.4: Rootkit Defense Tree:Klister Example
4.4 Furthering the state of the art
In order to increase the state of the art in finding techniques we need to continue
to innovate and create new ways to detect and “win” the arms race. One possible
way to increase detection abilities is to use the available hiding abilities. To this end,
we have created the following experiment which uses a hooking rootkit to find other
hooking rootkits. In Section 4.5 we outline the System Under Test (SUT), which is
then followed by an experiment overview in Section 4.6, setup in Section 4.7, and
outcomes in Section 4.8.
4.5 System Under Test
The system boundaries for this particular research must be limited in order to
be manageable and contribute information to the body of knowledge on rootkits. For
this research we make the following boundaries:
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4.5.1 Base System. Dell Latitude D510, Intel Celeron(R)M 1.40GHz pro-
cessor, 1G Ram, Windows XP Professional version 2002; service pack 2; fully patched
as of 8/21/2006.
4.5.2 Tested System. VMware Workstation version 5.5.1 build19175 with
Windows XP Professional version 2002; service pack 2; unpatched.
4.5.3 Software. Rootkits: HideProcessHookMDL, Modified HideProcessHook-
MDL, Hxdef100r, AFX2005, and Fu. Support Software: Procexp.exe, dbgview.exe,
calc.exe
4.6 Experiment Overview: Rooted Rootkits
It is our hypothesis that if a rootkit hides using a particular method that it can
also be modified to find other rootkits, of the same or “lesser” classes, using that same
method. The first experiment simply checks to see if a rootkit “HideProcessHook-
MDL” can be used to detect other rootkits that use the same and similar methods of
hiding.
HideProcessHookMDL (HPH) hides by hooking the SSDT and scrubbing the
content of the returned linked list for anything that has root in its name [25].
To detect the ability to find other rootkits we modified HideProcessHookMDL
such that it still hooks the SSDT but does not hide any processes, rather, it sends a
debug print statement which can be seen using Dbgview.exe [51] from Sysinternals.
Due to the technique used to hide via a hook into the SSDT, nothing is readily
seen as output until a call is generated looking for processes. Therefore, in order
to more closely monitor and show results for this experiment we used another tool
called procexp.exe [52] also from Sysinternals, because it continually calls for a list of
running processes. This also gives us the ability to see which processes are running
from the application perspective (procexp.exe) so that we can compare those with
what the modified hook (via the debug statements in dbgview.exe) sees running. It
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is also necessary to name a program with root in the name. For these experiments
we will simply make a copy of calc.exe and name it root calc.exe. The final piece
of software needed to make this experiment complete is InstDriver.exe [29] which is
used to install the modified HPH.
4.7 Experiment setup
Install Modified HPH on a clean system (Windows XP used). Start HPH. Start
Debugview. Start Process explorer. Start calc.exe and root calc.exe. Install and
start other hooks. Compare output of application and modified hook.
4.8 Outcomes
4.8.1 Experiment 1 Modified HPH vs unmodified HPH. This experiment
verified that HPH was working because the process ( root calc.exe) did not show up
in the process explorer. However, it showed that this particular hook could detect
itself because the hook did show up in debugview.
4.8.2 Experiment 2 Modified HPH vs Hxdef100r. This experiment verified
that both HPH and hxdef100r were working because the process (hxdefcalc.exe) did
not show up in the process explorer. However, it did show up in debugview. This
illustrates that the modified HPH was able to defeat hxdef100r.
4.8.3 Experiment 3 Modified HPH vs AFX2005. This experiment verified
that both HPH and AFX2005 were working because the process ( root calc.exe) did
not show up in the process explorer. However, it did show up in debugview. Which
furthermore illustrates that the modified HPH was able to defeat AFX2005.
4.8.4 Experiment 4 Modified HPH vs Fu. As expected this experiment
showed that Fu was able to continue hiding processes even with the modified HPH
installed because Fu uses a different hiding technique discussed previously called
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DKOM. This experiment further illustrates the “arms race” that exists with rootkits
versus rootkit detectors.
4.9 Metrics
Metrics in this experiment only had two outcomes, success or failure. The results
are summarized in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Test Results
In this chapter we have shown how attack trees and defense trees can be devel-
oped in order to identify holes in detection and also ways to detect in all branches




This thesis has shown the importance of understanding rootkit stealth tech-
niques and rootkit detection techniques. Many of the current technologies for each
stealth technique and detection class were illustrated in Chapter 3. Rootkit stealth
techniques can be examined using a graphical representation called an attack tree.
The attack tree and its counterpart the defense tree developed in this thesis show what
categories of techniques touch the base of the tree and shows to successfully defend
against all rootkits, each and every category of rootkits must be at least addressed. It
is also important to remember that this is rootkit research is very comparable to an
arms race in that, what works today may not work tomorrow because the attackers
will invent new ways of getting in that we as defenders have not yet thought of and
visa versa.
It was experimentally shown that a rootkit can successfully find other rootkits.
This research explored ways in which rootkits hide and also how they can be detected.
These hiding and finding techniques were used to create an attack tree from which
we can identify deficiencies in current detection techniques. Detection categorizations
were also refined.
The following section outlines some ideas for future research.
5.2 Future Research
5.2.1 Rootkit Detection concept: Screen Sweeping. Screen Sweeping is re-
moving data and/or results from the computer system user’s view. If a rootkit is
installed on a machine and a rootkit detector successfully identifies that there is a
rootkit present, the next logical step is to alert the user. If a rootkit can stop or
modify the detection report before it is sent to the computer screen then the user will
not know that a rootkit is present even if the detection tool was initially successful.
Screen Sweeping, suggests that in order to detect perfectly we must not only
detect but create a “secure channel” from the level of detection to the screen. This
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“secure channel” or “Secure I/O” [38] is one of the concepts that is currently being
addressed by work in Trusted Computing, which is explained in Section 2.4.
5.2.2 Rootkit Detection concept: Memory Tracking. Every system has a
finite amount of memory. We understand how memory is used and the algorithm-
s/applications that choose which memory will be used. If we can mark or track which
memory is being used by our known system and which memory is simply “trash” then
by carefully tracking the memory we should be able to see writing anomalies and thus
detect other potentially malicious software on our systems. For example, if we know
that we have 100 memory locations in our system and locations 1-10 are being used,
then we should know that upon installation of a new program or other such action
that memory location 11 should be written used (location of the next memory lo-
cation would be algorithm/software dependent but should be understood). If upon
installation we tracked memory and noted that the chosen location for installation
was not 11 but rather some other location then we can set a flag as anomalous and
further investigate. What is at memory location 11? Is it a bad sector? Is it malicious
code?
5.2.3 Research Questions.
1. Do multiple detection methods (ie, crossview) need to be used or can a trusted
channel be created that is sufficient to detect and report all rootkits?
2. Is the first “complete” rootkit installed on a machine truly the winner? Is there
no other detection/removal option if a rootkit addresses each category and each
level?
3. Can I detect hardware scans and feed them faulty information or hide from
them?
4. Are there any other classes of detection other than static and behavioral?
5. Are there any other implementations of the static detection class other than
signature and integrity?
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6. Are there any other implementations of the behavioral detection class other
than anomaly and signature?
7. Are there any other detection techniques other than crossview, hardware, cog-
nitive/human, software, remote attestation and memory tracking?
8. Explore ways to implement memory tracking.
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Appendix A. Windows Architecture
Figure A.1: Windows Architecture [19]
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Appendix B. UNIX Architecture
Figure B.1: UNIX Architecture [24]
Figure B.2: UNIX Architecture [24]
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Rootkit Tools designed to create and maintain an environment
on a computer in which attack tools and activities may
be hidden, such that a user does not know of their
presence on a compromised machine.,
Signature based detection Data is scanned for a pattern that comprise a “finger-
print” that is unique to a particular entity [11].,
Heuristic/behavioral based detection Behavioral based detection seeks to identify actions or
patterns that are abnormal to system operation. These
detection techniques “work by recognizing deviations in
“normal” system patterns or behaviors” [11].,
Crossview based detection Crossview based detection uses the idea of data redun-
dancy (the existence of equivalent data in more than
one location) to find “answers” from multiple sources
that should be the same in order to identify discrepan-
cies. An example of such is a child asking her mother
for permission to go to the park and then asking her
father permission for the same thing. The two answers
should be the same; however, the difference in answers
is what is exploited by the child. Detection techniques
would use the difference in answers to identify the ex-
istence of a rootkit [11].,
Integrity detection Integrity based detection compares a known good en-
tity with a suspected entity in order to verify the cor-
rectness/accurateness of the suspect entity. An ex-
ample of such is comparing “a current snapshot of
the filesystem or memory with a known, trusted base-
line” [11].,
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Hardware based detection Hardware based detection uses a piece of hardware to
implement signature, heuristic, crossview, or integrity
based detection while separating itself from the sus-
pected operating system [11].,
Steganography Steganography as quoted from the Mirriam-Webster’s
online dictionary is “the art or practice of concealing a
message, image, or file within another message, image,
or file” [45] However, a short definition which describes
how steganography works is: hiding in plain sight.,
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